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investigated. From Italian farm-level data we estimate a dynamic discrete choice
model of participation to investigate the role of experience. The methodology,
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experience influence the crop insurance decision making process. We found that
direct experience is a catalyst for insurance participation of medium and large
farms. The experience indirectly acquired is also relevant, especially for small
farms. Policy implications are discussed: in particular, we discuss on the impor-
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I Learn, You Learn, We Gain
Experience in Crop Insurance Markets
L’expe´rience de chacun est le tre´sor de tous
(Gerard de Nerval)
During recent decades, crop insurance programs have increased in promi-
nence in developed and developing countries, and participation has been
increased through subsidies (Mahul and Stutley, 2010). The world’s largest
risk management program - the United States of America’s one - supports
farmers through hedge funds, revenue insurance programs, mutual funds,
and weather indexes. In the European Union, Member States have adopted
autonomous national policies for assisting farmers through subsidized crop
insurance or mutual funds (Santeramo and Ramsey, 2017).
Italy has a long tradition of farm subsidies for risk management strategies,
but it has been difficult to achieve high level of crop insurance participation.
The public intervention started in 1970, with the so called Fondo di Sol-
idarieta´ Nazionale (FSN), intended to compensate farmers who had been
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affected by natural disasters. Starting in 2004 (through the Legislative De-
cree No. 102/2004) the system switched from ex post compensations to ex
ante subsidies. The FSN, and the subsequent crop insurance programs, have
been criticized by farmers’ unions due to repeated delays in payments, heavy
bureaucracy and complex procedures. Moreover, due to high costs of bu-
reaucracy, ineffectiveness of Defense Consortia, and lack of experience with
crop insurance contracts, farmers have been reluctant to participate in crop
insurance programs. It is not surprising that participation has remained as
low as 15% (Santeramo et al., 2016).
A vast number of studies have analyzed the determinants of participation
in crop insurance programs (Skees and Reed, 1986; Goodwin, 1993; Smith
and Goodwin, 1996; Sherrick et al. 2004; Walters et al., 2014; Tolhurst
and Ker, 2015; Menapace et al., 2015), the dynamics of subsidized crop
insurance programs (Coble and Barnett, 2013), and the potential effects of
innovative contracts (Maestro et al., 2016). Santeramo et al. (2016) analyzed
the drivers of enter and exit from the crop insurance market. However, the
existing research, with few exceptions (e.g. Cole et al., 2014; Santeramo,
2018), has stopped short of providing a deeper investigation into the role
of experience on participation in crop insurance programs. Rothschild and
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Stiglitz (1976), and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) argue that imperfect
knowledge and asymmetric information are likely to play a substantial role in
the insurance decision-making process. Analyzing the automobile insurance
market, Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997, p.75) concluded on the role of
imperfect knowledge and experience: ”learning can be expected to modify
this situation and [...] driver’s experience allows her to learn about her true
ability faster than the insurance company.”
Because a deeper comprehension of the frictions to participation in (sub-
sidized) crop insurance programs is a pressing issue for European Union (EU)
policymakers, exploring the role of experience (and information) is a promis-
ing area of research. Given for granted that imperfect information influence
participation (e.g. Goodwin, 2001; Walters et al., 2014), it is worth asking
further questions: Does What is the role of experience on participation? Are
there knowledge spillover effects among farmers?
We investigate how experience influence crop insurance decisions through
a dynamic model of participation. In particular, we focus on the role of
direct and indirect experience using a detailed 7-years firm-level panel of
Italian farms. We found that experience in crop insurance contracts tend
to increase participation: the experience acquired in past harvest seasons
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is likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge both on farmers’ and insurees’
sides, and thus to increase uptake. We conclude with a discussion directed to
a better implementation of policy interventions in the reformed EU Common
Agricultural Policy.
The Italian crop insurance system
The Italian system for risk management started in 1970 with the FSN, and
has evolved over time (Figure 1). Since early 2000s, risk management has
been based on ex-post compensations. In 2000, the Defense Consortia were
introduced in order to facilitate the match of supply (insurers) and demand
(farmers) in the subsidized crop insurance market. Since 2004, the Legislative
Decree 102/2004 introduced the multi-risks (i.e. multiple perils) contracts,
that covers all adversities, and ended the subsidies to mono-risk (i.e. single
peril) contracts, which have rapidly decreased in prominence (Table 1). The
share of contracts providing coverage only against one adversity has decreased
from 92.0% in 2004 to 50.2% in 2010. The Italian crop insurance policies are
subsidized through EU funds: subsidies were as high as 80% of the insurance
premium for contracts covering losses due to adverse weather conditions and
other natural disasters (indemnities are triggered by damages exceeding at
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least 30% of assured production), and up to 50% for contracts against losses
due to frequent adverse weather conditions as well as to animal or plant
diseases. In 2010, due to the EU Reg. 73/2009, the subsidies have been
lowered to 65%. Moreover, since 2014 the subsidized crop insurance policies
must cover at least three climatic adversities eligible for pluririsks policies,
which do not need to be mutually exclusive. The indemnities paid for mono-
and pluri-risks policies are computed through qualitative and quantitative
assessments of the percentage of losses due to the insured adversities; the
multi-risk policy, also known as yield insurance, compensates farmers for
losses due to a realized yield below the average (three or five years) historical
yield. In 2015 a new set of contracts has replaced the previous system: types
A, B and C offer coverage against different combinations of infrequent perils,
frequent perils, and additional adversities.
See table 1
Currently, the vast majority of contracts are purchased by farms located
in Northern Italy: in terms of insured value, in 2016 the North accounted
for almost 85.5%, the Centre for 8.6%, and the South for 5.9%. The number
of insured crops has increased from 58 (in 2002) to 164 (in 2010), although
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(in 2016) four crops accounted for more than half of the total insured value:
wine grapes, apple, rice, and corn.
The market structure consists of one public-private coinsurance pool,
twenty-five private insurance companies, and several mutual/cooperative en-
tities participating in the agricultural insurance system. Major insurance
companies are FATA Assicurazioni (13% of market share in 2005), Toro and
ARA Assicurazioni (7% of market share) (Mahul and Stutley, 2010), and
Cattolica Assicurazioni. While (private) insurance companies may set their
own premium rates, the companies coordinate pricing policies and set the
maximum levels of insurance premium eligible for public subsidies: as a re-
sult, ”competition is predominantly based on quality of insurance services”
(Mahul and Stutley, 2010, Annex E p.118).
The individual demand for crop insurance contracts is aggregated through
Defense Consortia, local institutions aimed at enhancing insurance uptake
by matching insurers’ supply and farmers’ demand. Farmers are offered
contracts from different insurance companies, and select the contract with the
highest perceived quality. The existence of Defense Consortia is symptomatic
of asymmetric information among insurers and farmers.
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On participation level and imperfect knowledge
Participation in crop insurance programs is usually promoted through sub-
sidies, and by offering a wide set of contracts. However leveraging crop in-
surance demand with subsidies comes with large marginal costs. According
to Glauber (2013), in the US an increase in subsidies from 2.73 (in 1981-
1994) to 7.76 dollars per acre (in 1999-2003) boosted marginal costs from
3.31 to 25.99 dollars per acre: the policy became costly and, in the long-run,
unsustainable. The implications of crop insurance subsidies go far beyond
an increase in participation. As extensively described in Coble and Barnett
(2013) and in Lusk (2017), subsidies increase regional differences in terms of
subsidies received, may hide ex-ante and ex-post opportunistic behavior (i.e.
adverse selection and moral hazard), and may favor rent seeking strategies.
How to design alternative (and not distortionary) policies is a legitimate
and important question. We focus on the impacts generated by imperfect
knowledge.
Imperfect and asymmetric information (i.e. lack of information on farmer
and/or insuree sides), through adverse selection (i.e. self-selection of riskier
farmers in the insurance market) and moral hazard (i.e. riskier behavior
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adopted by insured farmers), are key factors to explain low participation in
insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013). On one side, riskier in-
surees have private knowledge on the risks they face: they find profitable to
insure at the rate that insurers set for average-risky customers. Such adverse
selection mechanism pushes insurers to compensate their financial exposure
by setting higher rates (Goodwin and Smith, 2013; Glauber, 2013). On the
other side, insurers have private knowledge on the type of contract they of-
fer1, at the detriment of clarity and transparency of contracts to farmers
(Chiappori and Salanie 2000, 2013). A third channel through which imper-
fect knowledge disfavors participation consists of transaction costs implied by
bureaucracy - the (cumbersome) process to obtain subsidies for the premium
and to claim reimbursements for claimed losses. This channel disfavors par-
ticipation of farmers who are vulnerable to liquidity constraints (EC, 2001).
In all these cases the imperfect knowledge is likely to be resolved (at least
partially), under the insurance contract, at the end of the harvest season. In
other terms, a farmer who has stipulated an insurance contract will reveal
(at the end of the season, through the realization of her business) some of
1An alternative way to look at this problem is that insurance contract tend to be
overcomplicated by commas, clauses and footnotes that are not transparent when the
contract is accepted, or are not fully taken into consideration by the insuree.
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the private knowledge in terms of riskiness. On the other end, the insurer
will reveal to the insured farmer (at the end of the season, by honoring the
contract in case losses have been claimed) some of his own private knowledge
on the goodness of the contract. Finally, both the insurer and the farmer will
gain experience on the bureaucracy of insurance at the end of each season.
All in all, it is likely that the more contracts are stipulated, the higher the ex-
perience on both sides, the lower the frictions due to imperfect knowledge. A
similar mechanism has been hypothesized and tested in automobile (Cohen,
2005) and health care markets (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), which share
with the crop insurance markets the characteristics of dealing with slowly
depletable goods. The quality-based competition of Italian crop insurance
companies is likely to produce a similar type of asymmetric information.
Crop insurers put large effort on advertising their insurance policies and pro-
vide large set of contracts. Despite this, farmers encounter difficulties when
stipulating insurance contracts and look for assistance from Defense Consor-
tia, both catalyst of the demand for insurance and impartial guarantors of
the goodness of the contract. We model imperfect knowledge and evaluate
how it impacts on participation in crop insurance programs.
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The model
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) argue that the existence of learning by do-
ing (private knowledge) and learning from neighbors’ experience (shared
knowledge) enhance technology adoption. Thompson (2010) synthesizes how
(passive) learning influence strategic behavior. Chassagnon and Chiappori
(1997), Cohen (2005) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) deepen on the role
of private and shared information (through experience) on the likelihood of
buying insurance contracts. Our model focuses on the role of experience in
crop insurance decisions.
In standard expected-utility models of crop insurance participation (e.g.
Goodwin, 1993; Coble et al., 1996; Vedenov and Barnett, 2004), farmers
maximize the expected profit choosing inputs and farming strategies (Z),
and whether or not to purchase crop insurance (Insurance = {1, 0}). They
will choose insurance if the expected utility from profit with insurance is
greater than the expected utility from profit without insurance. What is left
out so far is the role of private information.
Learning-by doing and learning from others (Foster and Rosenzweig,
1995), information and social learning (Conley and Udry, 2010) are likely
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to influence strategic behavior (Conley and Udry, 2001; Thompson, 2010):
private information includes risk aversion (µ), and the familiarity (Ω) with
the insurance schemes that is gained experiencing - either directly or in-
directly - realizations of yields, claims, and indemnities. The probability
of participating in the insurance scheme depends on risk aversion (µ) and
familiarity (Ω). Again, farmers buy insurance if the expected utility with
insurance is greater than the expected utility without insurance:
(1) E[U(pi(Z, 1), µ,Ω)] > E[U(pi(Z, 0), µ,Ω)]
Risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt crop insurance, while the role
of familiarity with an insurance scheme is unclear. A farmer who is better
informed on the functioning of insurance contracts may be more or less will-
ing to adopt crop insurance, depending on how well the insurance program
works, and on how much are the net benefits (or losses) for participating
farmers. Hence, a priori we cannot conclude on the role of familiarity with
the program. Familiarity (Ωi,t = {Expi,t, Exp−i,t}) is gained through direct
(Expi,t) and indirect (Exp−i,t) experience: a farmer (i) may gain direct ex-
perience by participating in the program, and indirect experience from other
farmers (−i) who have participated in the program. In particular, by stipu-
lating insurance contracts (at time t− 1) the farmer become experienced (at
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time t); in addition, indirect experience is transferred from insured farmers
to uninsured farmers (at time t− 1) that become more experienced (at time
t) on the insurance program. The econometric specification of the model is
described in the subsequent section.
Empirical analysis
The section presents how we define experience, the data employed, the em-
pirical strategy and the results of the analysis.
Defining Experience
Farmers take advantage of gained experience to make their decision on in-
surance. Experience is gained by insuring or by collecting information from
others. Direct experience is expected to convey more information than indi-
rect experience and therefore to be a stronger driver for participation than
indirect experience. Empirically, we expect the coefficients for direct expe-
rience to be statistically significant and of larger magnitude with respect
to those of indirect experience. We consider two polar cases: experience
is purely transitory (if the knowledge accumulation process has very short
memory), or it is permanent (if the knowledge accumulation process has
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infinite memory). By modeling the variable with polar cases we are able iso-
late its extreme effects: they represent lower and upper bounds for different
specifications of experience (i.e. a continuous variable to assess the role of
cumulated experience induced).
If direct experience is purely transitory, an experienced farmer will exploit
only the information gained in the previous year. Direct transitory experience
(DTE) is as follows:
(2) DTE ≡ Expi,t = Insurancei,t−1
If direct experience is permanent, the information gained through insur-
ance lasts forever (i.e. once farmers have purchased insurance, the timing of
insurance is irrelevant). Direct permanent experience (DPE) is an indicator
function equals to one if the lagged dependent variable has been one at least
once in previous periods:
(3)DPE ≡ Expi,t =

1 if
∑t−1
l=1 Insurancei,t−l > 0
0 otherwise.
with Insurancei,t−l being equal to one if the farmer i had insurance in
year t − l and 0 otherwise (for instance, in the third period, with t = 3, we
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have Expi,t = 1 if Insurancei,t−1+Insurancei,t−2 > 0)2. In analogy with the
specification of direct experience, within each Region x (at time t), indirect
transitory experience (ITE) corresponds to the number of farmers who have
stipulated a crop insurance contract at time t − 1 , and indirect permanent
experience (IPE) corresponds to the number of farmers who have stipulated
a crop insurance contract at least once in the previous years (at time t − l,
with l ≥ 1). The indirect experience variable proxies how popular is crop
insurance in a specific Region. The indirect transitory experience sums the
lagged dependent variables for all farmers (nx) located in a Region (x):
(4) ITE ≡ Exp−i,t =
∑nx
j=1 Insurancej,t−1
with j 6= i , and j = 1, ..., nx
The indirect permanent experience sums, within a Region, all indicator
functions (Ij), defined to be equal to one if the lagged dependent variable
has been one at least once in previous periods:
(5) IPE ≡ Exp−i,t =
∑nx
j Ij,t
with j 6= i , and j = 1, ..., nx
with
2We gratefully acknowledge the referee for his/her help on the correct definition of the
notation.
15
Ij,t =

1 if
∑t−1
l=1 Insurancej,t−l > 0
0 otherwise.
We assumed that information is spread at Regional level for at least three
motivations: first, the historical data on production that are used to compute
multi-risk policies are computed and administered at regional level; second,
the insurance contracts are offered by Defense Consortia that are coordinated
at regional level; third, the requests for subsidies (and indemnities) need
to be directed to Regional offices, which are also in charge of processing
reimbursements for claimed losses.
Data
We use data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), a databank
representative of European commercial agriculture. The dataset consists of a
balanced panel data of 18,382 observations (2,626 Italian farms), continuously
observed from 2004 to 2010, located in nineteen different Italian Regions.
The uptake for crop insurance is spatially heterogeneous and (at aggregate
level) is low. Our dataset shows that a vast majority of farmers did not
stipulate insurance contracts, and only small fractions (less than 10%) of
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insured farmers stipulated contracts for two or more consecutive years (table
2). A smaller fraction of farmers (around 5%) has been insured for at least 4
consecutive years (from 2004 to 2007), dropping coverage in 2008, when new
insurance contracts (e.g. insurance contracts with no threshold or against
plant diseases) started to be offered. In our dataset demand for insurance
dropped by 50% in 2009 (with respect to the sample average, µ), with a
recovery to up 40% in 2010. A similar dynamic is observed for the entire
Italian crop insurance market: participation collapsed in 2009 and started to
increase again from 2010.
See table 2
Our dataset provides yearly information on land size, altitude, farmers’
age, diversification of farming activities, adoption of irrigation, farms’ rev-
enue. We compute revenue variability as standard deviation of farms’ rev-
enue (over the entire period, 2004-2010), and expected premium per hectare,
by averaging across Regions and farming systems the (crop-specific) total
premia, as proposed in Santeramo et al. (2016) and Goodwin (1993)3. The
variable proxies farming system-specific and region-specific levels of riskiness.
The variables ”Altitude”, ”Revenue Variability” and ”Expected premia” are
3Farm-level premium rates are not available in our dataset.
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fixed across time4. Descriptive statistics on experience variables are shown
in table 3 and figures 2 and 3, while statistics on control factors are reported
in table 4.
See table 3
See table 4
See figure 2
See figure 3
On average, farm size is small: in Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Lombardia
and Piemonte , it is eighteen hectares, compared to an average size of US
farms that is twenty-five times larger (500 hectares). A vast majority of
farms are not insured, and not irrigated: at regional level the participation
in crop insurance programs, and the adoption of irrigation do not exceed,
respectively, 23 and 43 percent (exception made for Liguria).
4Under the normative in place from 2004 to 2010 (cfr. figure 1) the subsidies have
been steadily at 80%, thus the (potential) effects of subsidies are captured by the constant
term. We gratefully acknowledge the comment of a reviewer on this issue.
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Econometric framework
Our data comprise seven years, up to 2010, of thousands of farms representa-
tive of the entire national population of Italian farms5. The (balanced) panel
data allows one to estimate the dynamics of the decision-making process in
the insurance program. We use a linear approximation of the equation (1)
for participation in crop insurance contracts:
(6) Prob(Insuranceit = 1|Ωi,t, Zi,t, µi) = Φ(γExpi,t + δExp−i,t + Z ′i,tβ + µi)
Given that Prob(Insuranceit = 1|Ωi,t, Zi,t, µi) is not observed, experience
is gained through participation (e.g. Expi,t = Insurancei,t−1), and farmers’
specific factors need to be taken into account, the model is estimated as
a dynamic random effects probit model (DREPM), following the Heckman
procedure.
The model requires an assumption on the relationships between the initial
observation (Insurancei,1) and the unobserved heterogeneity (µi). If the
initial observation is exogenous, the model can be estimated as a standard
Random Effects (RE) Probit Model. Instead, if the initial observation is
5More specifically, the farms included in the dataset (a subsample of the FADN dataset)
are selected on the basis of a survey plan, conducted by each EU Member State of the
EU in order to guarantee the representativeness. In particular, the dataset is constructed
after stratification of the universe of farms, according to the type of farms (e.g. type of
crops, livestocks, etc. ), and the geographical distribution.
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correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity, the RE probit estimator is
inconsistent and overestimates γ (i.e. the state dependence is overestimated).
Following Heckman (1981), we use a reduced form equation for the initial
observation (Ii,1) with instruments (Xi,1 = {Ωi,1, Zi,1, wi,1}) which includes
the sets of explanatory variables and of exogenous instruments (wi,1). The
instruments are assumed to be correlated with the farmers’ specific (random)
effects and uncorrelated with the error term.
Results
As preliminary analysis, we investigate whether data support the presence
of asymmetric information (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000): we found that
the (average) variability of production for insured farmers exceeds the (av-
erage) variability of production for uninsured farmers. The analysis does
not allow us to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard, but is valid
to conclude that insured farmers have larger variability in production and
therefore asymmetric information is likely to exist (Einav, Finkelstein and
Levin, 2010).
The estimates using a pooled probit model (PP), a standard random
effects probit model (RE), linear probability models (LPM), and a dynamic
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random effects probit model (DREPM) show that the effects of experience
tend to be larger in PP and RE models (table 5), while the opposite is true for
linear probability models (LPM)6. The signs of control factors are consistent
across estimators, but the coefficients for direct and indirect experience tend
to be larger for PP and RE models. The pooled probit estimates fail to
control for cross-correlation across the individual composite errors in different
periods. The LPMs investigate potential bias due to correlation across space
and time7: results are stable across specifications. By controlling for the
endogeneity of initial conditions (Heckman, 1981; Stewart, 2005), the effect
of the variable of interest is largely reduced. We estimate all remaining
models with the dynamic random effects probit model8.
6For the LPM the usual caveats apply: 1) the LPM can predict probabilities either
less than zero or greater than one; 2) conceptually, it seems not appropriate to model a
probability linearly to a continuous independent variable for all possible values in that
it would (implicitly) allow for values of the dependent variable above one or below zero.
The LPM model with fixed effects predicts 3328 observations outside of the [0,1] interval,
which account for 24.7% of the total sample. These caveats (nothing bindings value of
the dependent variable between 0 and 1, and linearity issues) can be addressed by using a
nonlinear binary response model such as a probit model. We are grateful to a review for
having pointed this out.
7We gratefully acknowledge the suggestions of a reviewer to investigate, through LPMs,
the correlation across space and time and the robustness of the results to the inclusion
of farm fixed effects and aggregate level premium rate at provincial level. We have also
computed standard errors robust to spatial correlation across Regions.
8We adopted, as instruments, two variables that capture the geographical location of
farmers (i.e. a dummy for South and a dummy for Centre) and a dummy that indicates
if the farm is organic. In the online appendix we show that the instruments satisfy the
conditions to have valid instruments, stated by Heckman (1981)
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See table 5
For sake of interpretability, we compute average partial effects (APE) for
direct and indirect experience: a consistent estimator is the change in the
probability distribution function (PDF) evaluated at the sample mean, after
normalization of the maximum likelihood (MLE) coefficients (Wooldridge,
2005).
The measures for direct and indirect experience are positive and statis-
tically significant. As already argued, direct experience tend to be more
influential than indirect experience9. Farmers who bought crop insurance
contracts in the past are more likely to buy (again) crop insurance: the op-
posite is true for farmers who never bought crop insurance contracts. Farmers
with direct experience in crop insurance are 10% more likely to buy (again)
insurance with respect to uninsured farmer; the coefficient for indirect ex-
perience, which refers to a change from no insured neighbor to the average
regional value of insured farmers, is statistically not different from zero (table
5). Moreover, transitory direct experience is stronger than permanent direct
experience (table 6): the likelihood of purchasing insurance is as high as 10%
9As suggested by one of the reviewers, the effects of permanent and transitory direct
experience coincide (and are largest) when the farmer buy crop insurance for the first time.
Subsequently, the effects of direct permanent experience tend to decrease over time.
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if a farmer has experienced insurance during the previous season, and only
3.5% if she had experience in earlier seasons (i.e. permanent experience).
The same conclusion cannot be drawn for indirect experience: transitory
experience is not relevant, whereas permanent experience increases the like-
lihood of insurance by 0.003%. This result reflects the intuition that indirect
experience is slowly transmitted, or, put differently, that the spillover effects
due to the familiarity with a crop insurance program are exploited after sev-
eral years. Albeit statistically significant, the impact of indirect experience is
rather small: this is in line with the common wisdom that indirect informa-
tion influence risk perception only if agents lack direct experience (Siegrist
and Gutscher, 2006; Wachinger et al., 2013).
See table 6
Other factors influence participation in crop insurance markets. Large
and irrigated farms are more likely to be insured, while farms located at high
altitude are less likely to be insured. The results are consistent with the
existing literature on crop insurance (Goodwin, 1993; Smith and Goodwin,
1996; Enjolras and Sentis, 2011; Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012; Singerman,
Hart and Lence, 2012)10. We observe a positive correlation between partic-
10Although not statistically significant, we found a negative relationships between farm-
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ipation in insurance schemes with the variables ”Revenue variability” and
”Expected premia”: the higher the revenue variability, the higher the like-
lihood of buying insurance contracts; the higher is the expected premium,
which reflects a higher level of underlying risk, the higher is the participa-
tion in crop insurance programs. This seemingly counterintuitive result is
explained by the crop data scarcity which is likely to impose higher premia
in some areas of Italy (Shen et al., 2016). In order to disentangle the effects of
premia we would need to rely on expert knowledge of the degree of riskiness:
unfortunately, those data are not available.
The results for North, Centre and South provide further insights: the role
of experience is less relevant where participation is higher (e.g. North). Two
(opposite) explanations help understanding these findings. On one hand,
since participation is likely to be driven by a diffused knowledge of insurance
contracts, the higher the participation, the lower the relevance of direct ex-
perience should be (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2010).
On the other hand, if insured farmers are self-selected, the insured farmers of
low-participation areas are expected to have stronger experience on insurance
ers’ age and crop diversification with participation in crop insurance programs. The results
are consistent with Smith and Goodwin (1996), Foudi and Erdlenbruch (2012), among oth-
ers.
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(and possibly higher benefits from insurance), and therefore are more likely
to buy insurance for consecutive years (Roy, 1951; Heckman and Sedlacek,
1985). The lower relevance of indirect experience in the North, where uptake
is higher, indicates decreasing returns to indirect experience and suggests
that information campaigns should be replicated on a regular basis11.
See tables 7 and 8
Direct and indirect experience have different impacts for farms differing
in (economic or land) size. The vast majority of farmers (medium farms)
takes advantage of direct and indirect experience: the higher the experience,
the higher the likelihood to participate in the program. For small farmers
direct experience is (relatively) less important than indirect experience (cfr.
columns 2 and 3). In order to understand this result, you need to consider
that small farms are usually owned by professionals with more remunerative
off-farm opportunities: their efforts (and the time invested) on farming ac-
tivities are relatively low, so that farming strategies are (partially) guided
by neighbors’ suggestions or by common wisdom. As one should expect,
insurance decisions for large farms are not influenced at all by indirect ex-
11Similarly, the direct experience shows decreasing returns. The results in appendix
(not attached) show that, ceteris paribus, the cumulated direct experience has a negative
and statistically significant coefficient.
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perience, but it is also true that direct experience is very important. Lastly,
transitory experience is more important than permanent experience: a re-
sult that is consistently explained by the dynamic alternation of managing
directors in large-size farms (rather than in small-size farms). The impact of
indirect experience is statistically significant in several cases, but it is eco-
nomically small: again, in line with the literature (Siegrist and Gutscher,
2006; Wachinger et al., 2013), we found that agents benefit from indirect
experience (second best) only when direct experience (first best) is lacking.
What have we learned from farmers’ experience?
Participation in crop insurance programs has been low for decades in the
EU, despite large subsidies granted by the governments. Further increases in
subsidies, implemented during recent years in the US, are likely to create dis-
tortive effects: subsidizing risk leads agents to assume more risks and costs to
raise rapidly (Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin and Smith, 2013). A dif-
ferent, complementary, strategy to approach the problem is highly desirable
for policymakers and taxpayers.
The factors affecting the demand for agricultural insurance have been
extensively studied, and the literature allows to draw conclusions on the
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role of assets (e.g. Goodwin, 1993; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Enjolras and
Sentis, 2011; Singerman, Hart and Lence, 2012; ), human capital (Smith
and Bacquet, 1996 ), farmers’ strategies (Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012) and
asymmetric information (Coble et al., 1997; Walters et al., 2014) on insur-
ance decisions. However, little evidence has been provided to establish the
role of experience in the crop insurance decision making process (exception
made for Cole et al., 2014 and Santeramo, 2018). We use a detailed farm-
level dataset to assess how experience influences the crop insurance decision
making process. We disentangle the role of direct and indirect experience.
We conclude that experience in crop insurance increases participation.
Intuitively, the direct experience acquired during the previous harvest sea-
son (or acquired over time) is likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge and
act as catalyst for participation. The indirect experience is also valuable:
the experience that farmers gain when they buy crop insurance contracts in-
fluence neighbors’ decisions. However, relevant geographic differences exist,
and policymakers should take them into account to promote participation.
The role of information, in terms of experience, is also differing by farm size.
Policymakers should take this dimension into consideration to improve the
efficacy of planned interventions. They should pursue strategies to increase
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participation (potentially even at a significant short-run cost) to take ad-
vantage of the inertia and the spillover effects that emerge from experience.
Once experience is gained, there may be less frictions to participate in in-
surance programs, hence the leverage of subsidies may be diverted from old
clients (farmers who have already experienced crop insurance) to new clients
(farmers who have never experienced crop insurance).
Ad hoc measures may be implemented to increase participation of small
farms, which (traditionally) are more reluctant to adopt insurance. For
instance, participation of small farms may be promoted through one-time
(heavily) subsidized premia, through targeted informative campaigns, or by
discounting premium rates. Lastly, multi-year insurance contracts (e.g. at
lower premia) may be appealing for uninsured farms. The proposed measures
are not new: proposing competitive tariffs for new clients is the normality for
companies in the markets of telephony, or car insurance. We are proposing
to import new scheme of business in a market that presents several frictions
to entry, especially for small farmers.
The importance of imperfect information has been highlighted, but few
possible limitations need to be underlined. The external validity of our re-
sults is limited by the lack of information about the type of contracts stip-
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ulated. However, even if such data were available, the main results should
not change: the asymmetric information between farmers and insurers is
partially resolved through experience, which stimulates insurance coverage
renewals. In addition, potential omitted variables bias may be a drawback:
however, the sensitivity analyses conducted by using fixed effects across space
and time exclude major temporal/spatial systematic errors.
To the extent that increasing uptake in crop insurance markets is a main
goal for policymakers in most developed countries, understanding how im-
perfect knowledge is resolved represents a promising area for future research.
With data availability increasing more and more, understanding how farmers
decide to switch among contracts is also an important research question to
help planning policy interventions. Extension for this analysis should move
in this direction.
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Online Appendix A: The model
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) argue that the existence of learning by doing and
learning from neighbors’ experience enhance technology adoption. Thompson
(2010) synthesizes how passive learning influence strategic behavior. Similarly,
it is likely that private and shared information influence the likelihood of insur-
ance. Our model allows to conclude on the role of experience in crop insurance
decisions.
Assume the profit of a farmer to be additively separable over two variables:
the insurance decision (I = {0, 1}) and a set of variables (Z) describing the eco-
nomic environment of the farm (such as land size, irrigation, number of crops,
etc.). Farmers maximize the expected profit choosing input, farming strategies,
and whether or not to purchase crop insurance. If insurance is actuarially fair,
farmers’ expected profit (E[pi(Z, I)]) under insurance (I = 1) and under not in-
surance (I = 0) (conditional on other factors, Z) should be equal:
(1) E[pi(Z, 1)] = E[pi(Z, 0)]
However, insurance decision is a personal one, and it is influenced by several
factors that are private for the farmer. The farmers’ problem is to insure or not
in order to maximize (subjective) expected profits. Assuming risk aversion, they
will choose insurance if the expected utility from profit with insurance is greater
37
than the expected utility from profit without insurance12:
(2) E[U(pi(Z, 1))] > E[U(pi(Z, 0))]
What is left out so far is the role of private information13. Information,
learning-by doing and learning from others (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995), social
learning (Conley and Udry, 2010) are likely to influence strategic behavior (Conley
and Udry, 2001; Thompson, 2010): private information includes risk aversion (µ)
and familiarity (Ω) with the insurance scheme which is gained through experience
- either directly or indirectly - and the observation of past realizations. We assume
the probability of participating in the insurance scheme to be a function of risk
aversion (µ) and familiarity (Ω) , and therefore farmers will choose insurance if
the expected utility with insurance is greater than the expected utility without
insurance:
(3) E[U(pi(Z, 1), µ,Ω)] > E[U(pi(Z, 0), µ,Ω)]
Risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt crop insurance, while the role
of familiarity with an insurance scheme is unclear. A farmer who is better in-
formed on the functioning of insurance contracts may be more or less willing to
12Our data support the hypothesis that expected profit under insurance is greater than
expected profit under no insurance.
13Other non-private information factors such as liquidity, product quality, trust, risk
aversion, wealth, or culture, are likely to be (at least partially) captured by the farmers
fixed effects.
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adopt crop insurance, depending on how well the insurance program works, and
on how much are the net benefit (or loss) for participating farmers. Hence, a pri-
ori we cannot conclude on the role of familiarity with the program. Familiarity
(Ωi,t = {Expi,t, Exp−i,t}) is gained through direct (Expi,t) and indirect (Exp−i,t)
experience: a farmer (i) gains direct experience by participating in the program;
he may also gain indirect experience from others (−i), by interacting with farmers
who have experienced the insurance scheme14.
14To make it clearer, farmers are expected to know Ωt at time t. Direct experience is
gained only by stipulating an insurance contracts, while indirect experience is transferred
from insured farmers (at time t− 1) to uninsured farmers (at time t− 1) and is exploited
at time t.
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Online Appendix B: Econometric details
The linear approximation of equation for participation in crop insurance contracts
can be easily estimated using the following specification:
Prob(Iit = 1|µi,Ωi,t, Zi,t) = Φ(γExpi,t + δExp−i,t + Z ′i,tβ + µi)
Given that Prob(Iit = 1|µi,Ωi,t, Zi,t) is not observed, and experience is gained
through participation (e.g. Expi,t = Ii,t−1), the model is estimated as a dynamic
probit model.
It must be noted that even if the error terms of the probit model are assumed
serially independent, there exists serial correlation induced by the time-invariant
term (µi)
15. Since the dependent variable (Iit) is a binary variable (the decision
to insure or not), we normalize it by imposing a unitary value for the variance of
the error term (σ2u = 1). The (conditional) transition probability for i at time t is
as shown in Heckman (1981)16:
Prob(Ii,t = 1|µi, Ii,t−1, Exp−i,t, Zi,t) = Φ[(γIi,t−1 +δExp−i,t+Z ′i,tβ+µi)(2Ii,t−1)]
15This specification implies equi-correlation between vi,t = µi +ui,t in any two different
periods: λ = Corr(vi,t, vi,s) =
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2
u
. We may also estimate a more general model
by relaxing the assumption of no autocorrelation of the error term. The model requires
T-dimensional integrals of normal densities but, although feasible, it requires a great
computation effort (Stewart, 2005). The estimates of the state dependence coefficient are
generally slightly lower, therefore the model we estimate represents an upper bound, a
conservative measure to not overestimate the effects of experience.
16The result follows from the the normality assumption of the probit model error term
(ui,t)
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution. The model requires an assumption on the relationships between the initial
observation (Ii,1) and the unobserved heterogeneity (µi). The simplest solution is
to assume the initial observation exogenous, but this is a strong assumption for
the vast majority of datasets, whose start period does not coincide with the start
of the process17. If the initial observation is correlated with the unobserved het-
erogeneity, the standard Random Effects (RE) probit estimator is inconsistent and
overestimates γ (i.e. the state dependence is overestimated). Following Heckman
(1981), we use a reduced form equation for the initial observation (Ii,1) with in-
struments (Xi,1) which includes the set of explanatory variables (Exp−i,1, Zi,1) for
the main model and exogenous instruments (xi,1). The instruments are assumed
to be correlated with the random effects and uncorrelated with the error term18
The joint probability for the sequence of Ii,t is as follows (Heckman, 1981):
Φ[(X ′i,1ζ + θµi)(2Ii,t − 1)]ΠTt=2Φ[(γIi,t−1 + δExp−i,t + Z ′i,tβ + µi)(2Ii,t − 1)]
and the model is estimated by maximizing, over µ∗ = µσµ and σµ =
√
λ
1−λ , the
likelihood overall all farmers:
Πi
∫
µ∗
{
Φ[(X ′i,1ζ + θµ
∗σµ)(2Ii,t − 1)]
17If the assumption is correct, the model can be estimated as a standard Random Effects
(RE) Probit Model.
18For details on the treatment of unobserved heterogeneity, the interested reader may
refer to Wooldridge (2005, p.41).
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ΠTt=2Φ[(γIi,t−1 + δExp−i,t + Z ′i,tβ + µ
∗σµ)(2Ii,t − 1)]
}
dF (µ∗)
The integral has been evaluated using the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature (But-
ler and Moffitt, 1982 ; Stewart, 2005). Following Wooldridge (2005), we evaluate
the estimates by computing the average partial effects (APE) of state dependence
(Ii,t−1). We multiply the coefficient γˆµ by a weighted sample average of the distri-
bution:
N−1
∑N
i=1 Φ(γˆµIi,t−1 + δˆµExp−i,t + Z
′
i,tβˆµ)γˆµ
where the subscript µ indicates that the parameter need to multiplied by (1 +
σ2µ)
−1/2, and in particular γˆµ = γ(1 + σ2µ)−1/2, δˆµ = δ(1 + σ2µ)−1/2, βˆµ = β(1 +
σ2µ)
−1/2, and the coefficients γ, δ and β are the MLE estimates.
In order to compute average partial effects (APE) for direct and indirect expe-
rience we compute the change in the probability distribution (PDF) function eval-
uated at the sample mean, after normalization of the maximum likelihood (MLE)
coefficients. Empirically, we multiply the MLE parameters by (1 + σˆ2µ)
−1/2, and
evaluate the PDF under different values for ”Experience” at the sample mean19.
19Knowing that λ =
σ2µ
σ2µ+σ
2
u
and σ2u = 1, we compute σˆ
2
µ =
λ
1−λ .
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Online Appendix C: On the appropriateness of instru-
mental variables
In order to show the validity of the instruments, we describe the approach we follow
(proposed by Heckman, 1981). The variables adopted as instruments respect the
conditions stated by Heckman (1981). For clarity we will restate the notation of
our manuscript and emphasize the differences with the notation adopted in Stewart
(2006).
The latent equation for the dynamic random effects probit model (the equation
6 in our paper: Prob(Insuranceit = 1|Ωi,t, Zi,t, µi) = Φ(γExpi,t + δExp−i,t +
Z ′i,tβ + µi)) is equivalent to the specification in Stewart (2006). It allows us to
recover the fixed terms (µi in equation 6, and named αi in Stewart, 2006) and
the error terms (ui,t in Stewart, 2006). We estimate the econometric specification
(equation 1 in Stewart, 2006) that allows us to recover αi and ui,t:
y∗i,t = γy
∗
i,t−1 + x
′
i,tβ + αi + ui,t
where y∗i,t represents Insurancei,t, x
′
i,t is the vector of explanatory variables
(in our manuscript Z ′i,t), and αi are individual-specific effects (in our manuscript
µi).
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Again, we are interested in αi and ui,t, so we store these elements for the
diagnostics. As further step, and in order to recover (and store) the elements
ui,1, we estimate a regression for the initial value of the latent variable (i.e. being
insured in 2004):
y∗1,t = z′i,1pi + θαi + ui,1
It should be noted that ηi = θαi + ui,1, therefore the above equation may be
rewritten as y∗1,t = z′i,1pi + ηi (cfr. Stewart, 2006). We recover (and store) the
elements ηi for the diagnostics.
The approach to the initial conditions problem proposed by Heckman (1981)
requires to estimate an equation for the initial value of the latent variable with
appropriate instruments. The appropriateness of the instruments is validate by
the satisfaction of several conditions on the correlations across individual effects
and error terms. Here are the conditions:
1) Corr(αi, ηi) has to be high
2) Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t≥2 has to be lower than Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t=1
3) Corr(αi, ui,1) has to be low
Our results are in line with the conditions stated above. In particular, we
found Corr(αi, ηi) = 0.672 , that is the individual effects are correlated with
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residuals of the equation for the initial value of the latent variable. Moreover, we
found that Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t≥2 < Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t=1, where t = 1 refers to 2004. In
particular, we found the correlations to be respectively equal to 0.61 and to 0.73
for Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t≥2 and Corr(ui,t, ηi)|t=1. Finally, we found that Corr(αi, ui,1) =
0.15. Based on these results, which show that the conditions stated by Heckman
(1981) are satisfied, we are able to state that the chosen instruments are valid for
credible identification of the latent variable in the first period.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of experience variables (averages)
DTE DPE ITE IPE
Valle DAosta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Piemonte 0.06 0.06 9.12 12.00
Lombardia 0.10 0.18 15.00 31.41
Trentino 0.44 0.51 19.52 42.01
AltoAdige 0.29 0.38 10.06 25.42
Veneto 0.09 0.12 12.58 31.11
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia 0.14 0.22 6.57 18.53
Liguria 0.01 0.01 0.47 3.14
Emilia Romagna 0.02 0.09 1.84 2.85
Toscana 0.08 0.09 5.05 11.51
Marche 0.01 0.01 0.57 0.71
Umbria 0.16 0.25 5.05 6.71
Lazio 0.01 0.03 0.68 1.57
Abruzzo 0.05 0.09 4.48 13.01
Molise 0.02 0.05 1.92 7.42
Calabria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Puglia 0.09 0.15 9.18 21.02
Basilicata 0.02 0.03 1.61 2.14
Sicilia 0.05 0.06 6.50 14.02
The averages are for the entire sample period: 2004-2010.
DTE stands for Direct Transitory Experience; DPE stands
for Direct Permanent Experience; ITE stands for Indirect
Transitory Experience; IPE stands for Indirect Permanent
Experience.
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Figure 2: Direct Transitory Experience
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Figure 3: Indirect Transitory Experience
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Table 6: Alternative Experience Measures
1 2
Transitory Direct Experience 1.07∗
[0.00]
Permanent Direct Experience 0.92∗
[0.00]
Transitory Indirect Experience 0.0031
[0.32]
Permanent Indirect Experience 0.0076∗
[0.00]
Land Size 0.0020∗ 0.0019∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Altitude -0.15+ -0.093
[0.10] [0.30]
Age -0.0027 -0.0067∗
[0.40] [0.03]
Revenue variability 0.53+ 0.38
[0.08] [0.19]
Diversification -0.014 -0.0026
[0.88] [0.98]
Irrigation 0.88∗ 0.91∗
[0.00] [0.00]
E[Premium/Ha] 0.91+ 0.72
[0.06] [0.12]
Logit λ 0.44∗ 0.24
[0.00] [0.25]
Ln θ 0.73∗ 0.38∗
[0.00] [0.00]
λ 0.61∗ 0.56
[0.00] [0.26]
θ 2.07∗ 1.46∗
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 18382 18382
p-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05
Reported coefficients are APEs computed as described in the manuscript.
Control factors include land size, altitude, age, revenue variability, di-
versification, irrigation, and expected premium per hectare. Land size is
expressed in hectares, age in years, sigma revenues is expressed in mln
of euro, and expected premium per hectare in .000 of euro. Altitude,
diversification and irrigation are dummy variables.
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Figure 4: Land size by macroregions in 2010
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Figure 5: Farmers’ age by macroregions in 2010
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Figure 6: Irrgation by macroregions in 2010
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Figure 7: Diversification by macroregions in 2010
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